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Abstract
We study whether a central bank should deviate from its objective of price stability to
promote financial stability. We tackle this question within a textbook New Keynesian model
augmented with capital accumulation and microfounded endogenous financial crises. We
compare several interest rate rules, under which the central bank responds more or less
forcefully to inflation and aggregate output. Our main findings are threefold. First, monetary
policy affects the probability of a crisis both in the short run (through aggregate demand)
and in the medium run (through savings and capital accumulation). Second, a central bank
can both reduce the probability of a crisis and increase welfare by departing from strict
inflation targeting and responding systematically to fluctuations in output. Third, financial
crises may occur after a long period of unexpectedly loose monetary policy as the central
bank abruptly reverses course.
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“While monetary policy may not be quite the right tool for the job, it
has one important advantage relative to supervision and regulation
—namely that it gets in all of the cracks.” (Stein (2013))
1 Introduction
The effect of monetary policy on financial stability is ambivalent. On the one hand, loose
monetary policy can help stave off financial crises. In response to the Covid–19 shock, for
example, central banks swiftly lowered interest rates and acted as a backstop to the financial
sector. These moves likely prevented a financial collapse that would otherwise have exacerbated
the damage to the economy. On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that, by keeping their
policy rates too low for too long, central banks may entice the financial sector to search for yield
and feed macro–financial imbalances.1 Loose monetary policy is thus sometimes regarded as one
of the causes of the 2007–8 Great Financial Crisis (GFC). Taylor (2011), in particular, refers to
the period 2003–2005 in the US as the “Great Deviation”, which he characterizes as one when
monetary policy became less rule–based, less predictable, and excessively loose.
This ambivalence prompts the question of the adequate monetary policy in an environment
where credit markets are fragile and financial crises may have multiple causes.2 What are
the channels through which monetary policy affects financial stability? Should central banks
deviate from their objective of price stability to promote financial stability? To what extent may
monetary policy itself brew financial vulnerabilities? We study these questions within a novel
New Keynesian (NK) model, where crises may arise endogenously, after a protracted boom or in
the face of adverse non–financial shocks. Further, to precisely identify the effects of monetary
policy, we abstract from any other type of policy, such as tax or macroprudential policies.3
Our model departs from the textbook —three–equation— NK model in four important
ways. First, it features endogenous capital accumulation, so that the economy may deviate
persistently from its steady state and feature protracted booms and macro–financial imbalances.
Second, firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, in addition to aggregate ones.
This heterogeneity gives rise to capital reallocation between productive and unproductive firms
via a credit market.4 Third, we introduce financial frictions that make this credit market fragile.
1Empirical evidence on the potential adverse effects of loose monetary policy on financial stability can be found
in e.g., Maddaloni and Peydró (2011), Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina (2014).
2The Federal Reserve and European Central Bank (ECB)’s recent strategy reviews both emphasize that the
importance of financial stability considerations in the conduct of monetary policy has increased since the Great
Financial Crisis (Goldberg, Klee, Prescott, and Wood (2020), ECB (2021), Schnabel (2021)).
3In this paper, we consider financial stability risks emanating from the fragility of credit markets (“market
runs”), as opposed to those emanating from the fragility of financial institutions (e.g. “bank runs”). In our
case, macroprudential policies that apply to financial institutions are therefore less relevant. Another reason
for abstracting from macroprudential policies is that they may not always offer full protection against financial
stability risks, for example if they prompt regulatory arbitrage or the emergence of shadow banks.
4One may interpret this credit market as a disintermediated corporate bond market or as an intermediated
loan market, where banks would stand in–between buyers and sellers, the former taking bank loans to buy capital
goods and the latter depositing the proceeds of the sales into the banks. Provided that banks are not themselves
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One friction is that investors may not be able to seize the wealth of a defaulting borrower, thus
allowing firms to borrow and abscond. This limited enforcement problem induces investors to
constrain the amount of funds that each firm can borrow. Another friction is that idiosyncratic
productivities are private information. Together, these frictions imply that the loan rate must
be above a minimum threshold to entice the least productive firms to lend —rather than borrow.
When the marginal return on capital is too low, not even high–productivity firms can afford
paying the minimum loan rate and the credit market collapses. This is what we call a financial
crisis. Most crises in our model break out toward the end of a protracted economic boom, when
there is excess capital in the economy and the marginal productivity of capital is low. Crises are
also characterized by capital misallocation and a severe recession. Finally, the fourth departure
from the textbook model is that we solve our model globally, which allows us to capture the
non–linearities embedded in the endogenous booms and busts of the credit market.
We study whether monetary policy can tame such booms and busts and, more generally,
whether a central bank should deviate from its objective of price stability to promote financial
stability. In the process, we compare the performance of the economy under simple linear interest
rate rules, non–linear rules, and discretion. Our main findings are threefold.
First, monetary policy affects the probability of a crisis not only in the short run through its
usual effects on output and inflation, but also in the medium run through its effects on capital
accumulation. In particular, policies that systematically dampen output fluctuations tend to
slow down the accumulation of savings. The lower saving rate stems excess capital accumulation
and helps prevent financial crises. As these effects go through agents’ expectations, they require
that the central bank commit itself to a policy rule, and only materialize themselves in the
medium run.
Second, a central bank can increase welfare by departing from strict inflation targeting
(henceforth, SIT) and responding systematically to fluctuations in output. For example, we
show that welfare may be higher under a Taylor–type rule, whereby the central bank responds
to both inflation and output, than under SIT, even though the latter policy is optimal in the
absence of financial frictions.
Third, we study the effects of discretionary monetary policy interventions, i.e. deviations
from the rule, on financial stability. We show that financial crises may occur after a long period
of unexpected monetary easing and that, in those instances, they break out when the central
bank reverses course and abruptly raises its policy rate.
At last, we discuss the welfare gain of following more complex —but perhaps less realistic—
monetary policy rules, whereby the central bank commits itself to doing whatever it takes
whenever needed to forestall a crisis. We find that such policy significantly improves welfare
but also increases the fragility of the financial sector, forcing the central bank to backstop the
financial sector relatively often.
subject to financial frictions, adding banks is inessential and will not change anything to our results. Abstracting
from banks, though, makes clear that entity–based regulations or policies may not suffice to contend with credit
markets’ intrinsic fragility (Stein (2013)).
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The paper bridges two main strands of the literature. The first is on monetary policy and
financial stability. Like Woodford (2012) and Gourio, Kashyap, and Sim (2018), we introduce
endogenous crises in a standard NK framework.5 The main difference is that they use reduced
forms to determine how macro–financial variables (e.g. credit gap, credit growth, leverage) affect
the likelihood of a crisis, whereas in our case financial crises —including their probability and
size— are microfounded and derived from first principles. This has important consequences
in terms of the prescriptions of the model. One is that, in our model, monetary policy also
influences the size of the recessions that follow crises, and therefore the associated welfare cost.
Another is that, even though crises can be seen as credit booms “gone wrong”, as documented
in Schularick and Taylor (2012), not all booms are equally “bad” and conducive to crises in
our model (see also Gorton and Ordoñez (2019)) —a key element to determine how hard to
lean against booms. More generally, our findings do not depend on any postulated reduced
functional form for the probability of a crisis. In this sense, our model can be seen as a canonical
NK model with endogenous financial crises that provides microfoundations to existing models
such as Woodford (2012) and Svensson (2017). The second strand of the literature relates to
quantitative macro–financial models with microfounded endogenous financial crises (Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2015), Boissay, Collard, and Smets (2016), Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino
(2019)).6 The novelty here is that we use our model to study the link between monetary policy
and financial stability. Ours also complements existing work (e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015),
Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019)) in that it focusses on the fragility of financial markets,
as opposed to institutions, and highlights excess savings and capital accumulation (instead of
excess bank leverage) as a source of fragility.
Our paper also belongs to the literature on the transmission of monetary policy in heteroge-
neous agent New Keynesian (HANK) models. Most existing HANK models focus on household
heterogeneity and study the channels through which this heterogeneity shapes the effects of
monetary policy on aggregate demand (Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017), Kaplan, Moll, and
Violante (2018), Auclert (2019), Debortoli and Gaĺı (2021)). In contrast, our model is on the
effects of firm heterogeneity (as in Adam and Weber (2019), Manea (2020), Ottonello and
Winberry (2020)) and the role of credit markets in channelling resources to the most productive
firms.
Though in a more indirect way, our paper is also connected to recent works on how changes
in monetary policy rules affect economic outcomes in the medium term (e.g. Borio, Disyatat,
and Rungcharoenkitkul (2019), Beaudry and Meh (2021)) as well as to works on the link
between firms’ financing constraints and capital misallocation (Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006)).
In particular, the notion that financial crises impair capital re–allocation dovetails with the
narrative of the GFC in the US and the literature that shows that a great deal of the recession
5See Smets (2014) for a review of the literature as well as Bernanke and Gertler (2000), Gaĺı (2014), Filardo
and Rungcharoenkitkul (2016), Svensson (2017), Cairó and Sim (2018), Ajello, Laubach, López-Salido, and Nakata
(2019).
6See also Benigno and Fornaro (2018), Paul (2020), and Dou, Lo, Muley, and Uhlig (2020) for a recent review
of the literature.
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that followed the GFC can be explained by capital misallocation ((Campello, Graham, and
Harvey (2010)), Foster, Grim, and Haltiwanger (2016), Argente, Lee, and Moreira (2018)).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our theoretical framework, with a focus on
the microfoundations of endogenous financial crises, and describes the channels through which
monetary policy affects financial stability. Section 3 presents the parametrization of the model
as well as the average macroeconomic dynamics around financial crises. Section 4 revisits the
“divine coincidence” result and analyzes the tradeoff between price and financial stability. In
Section 5, we study the effect of monetary policy shocks on financial stability as well as whether
a central bank should commit itself to forestall crises. A last section concludes.
2 Model
Our model is an extension of the textbook NK model (Gaĺı (2015)), with sticky prices à la
Rotemberg (1982) and capital accumulation, where financial frictions give rise to occasional
endogenous credit market freezes.
2.1 Agents
The economy is populated with a central bank, a representative household, a continuum of
monopolistically competitive retailers, and a continuum of competitive intermediate goods
producers (henceforth, “firms”). The only non–standard agents are the firms, which live one
period, are ex ante identical but experience ex post idiosyncratic productivity shocks that prompt
them to resize their capital stock and participate in a credit market.
2.1.1 Central Bank
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate it on the risk–free bond according to the following
simple policy rule:









where πt are Yt and aggregate inflation and output in period t, and Y is the aggregate output in
the stochastic steady state. The central bank implicitly targets a zero inflation rate. Throughout
the paper, we experiment with different values of ϕπ and ϕy —including a Taylor–type rule with
Taylor (1993)’s original parameters (henceforth, TR93), as well as with a SIT rule whereby the
central bank sets the policy rate so that πt = 0 at all t.
2.1.2 Household Sector
The representative household is infinitely lived. In period t, the household supplies Nt hours of







ϵ−1 , with Ct(i) the consumption of good i purchased at price Pt(i), and
invests its savings in risk–free nominal bonds Bt and equity Qt(j) —in units of the consumption
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basket— issued by newborn firm j (with j ∈ [0, 1]). The household can thus be seen as a venture
capitalist providing startup equity funding to intermediate goods producers.
















Qt(j)dj ≤ WtNt + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + Pt
∫ 1
0
Dt(j)dj + Xt (2)
for t = 0, 1, ...,+∞, where Dt(j) is firm j’s the dividend payout (expressed in final goods), and
Xt denotes lump–sum transfers.8 The conditions describing the household’s optimal behavior




























= 1 ∀j ∈ [0, 1] (6)
where









1−ϵ the price of the consumption basket. Since firms are born without
resources and ex ante identical, the household ultimately invests the same amount Qt in every
firm:
Qt(j) = Qt ∀j ∈ [0, 1] (8)
2.1.3 Retailers
A continuum of infinitely–lived retailers purchase intermediate goods at price pt, differentiate
them, and resell them in a monopolistically competitive environment subject to nominal price
rigidities. Each retailer i ∈ [0, 1] sells Yt(i) units of the differentiated final good i and, following






7The term Et(·) denotes the expectation conditional on the information set available at the end of period t.
8These lump–sum transfers consist of retailers’ rebated profits and menu costs. Since the firms live only one
period, it should be clear that those that issue equity at the end of period t are not the same as those that pay








ϵ−1 denotes the aggregate output. The demand for final goods emanates
from both the representative household and the firms, which use them as inputs to produce
intermediate goods. More specifically, capital goods take the form of a basket of final goods







It ∀i ∈ [0, 1] (9)






Yt ∀i ∈ [0, 1] (10)
where Yt(i) = Ct(i) + It(i) and Yt = Ct + It.10 Each period, the retailer chooses its price Pt(i)



















subject to (10) for t = 0, 1, . . . ,+∞, where Λt,t+k ≡ βk (Ct+k/Ct)−σ is the stochastic discount
factor between period t and t+ k and τ = 1/ε is a subsidy rate on the purchase of intermediate
goods.11
In the symmetric equilibrium, where Yt(i) = Yt and Pt(i) = Pt, the optimal price setting
behavior satisfies



















and M ≡ ϵ/(ϵ− 1) is its (deterministic) steady state value.
2.1.4 Intermediate Goods Producers (“Firms”)
Firms live only one period, are born at the end of period t − 1 and die at the end of period
t. Thus, two generations of firms overlap at the end of each period. Consider firm j ∈ [0, 1]
born at the end of period t− 1. At birth, this firm receives Pt−1Qt−1 startup equity funding,
which it immediately uses to buy Kt units of capital goods. Among the latter, (1 − δ)Kt−1 are
old capital goods that they purchase from the previous generation of firms, where δ is the rate
of depreciation (or maintenance cost) of capital, and It−1 are newly produced capital goods.
New capital goods are produced instantaneously and one–for–one with final goods, and are
9Since capital goods are homogenous to consumption goods, they also have the same price Pt.
10This expression is obtained under the assumption that menus costs are rebated lump-sum to the household.
11This subsidy corrects for monopolistic market–power distortions in the flexible–price version of the model.
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homogenous to the old capital goods (net of the depreciation and maintenance cost).12 All
capital goods are therefore purchased at price Pt−1, implying that
Kt = Qt−1 (13)
At the beginning of period t, firm j experiences an aggregate shock, At, as well as an idiosyncratic
productivity shock, ωt(j), and has access to a constant–return–to–scale technology represented
by the production function (see, e.g. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006))
yt(j) = At(ωt(j)Kt(j))αNt(j)1−α (14)
where Kt(j) and Nt(j) denote the levels of capital and labor that firm j uses as inputs conditional
on the realization of ωt(j) and At, and yt(j) is the associated output. The idiosyncratic shock
ωt(j) ∈ {0, 1} takes value 0 for a fraction µ of the firms (“unproductive”) and 1 for a fraction 1−µ
of the firms (“productive”). We denote the set of unproductive firms by Ωut ≡ {j | ωt(j) = 0}
and that of productive firms by Ωpt ≡ {j | ωt(j) = 1}. The aggregate shock At evolves randomly
according to a stationary AR(1) process ln(At) = ρa ln(At−1)+εat with |ρa| < 1 and ε; N(0, σ2a).
Upon observing ωt(j), firm j may resize its capital stock by purchasing or selling capital
goods. To fill any gap between its desired capital stock Kt(j) and its initial (and predetermined)
one, Kt, firm j may borrow or lend on a credit market. The latter thus operates in lockstep with
the capital goods market. If Kt(j) > Kt, firm j borrows and uses the proceeds to buy capital
goods. If Kt(j) < Kt, it instead sells capital goods and lends the proceeds to other firms.
Let rct denote the real rate on the credit market, and assume that firm j buys (or sells)
|Kt(j) −Kt| capital goods, hires labor Nt(j), and produces intermediate goods yt(j). Then, at
the end of the period, this firm sells its production yt(j) to retailers at price pt, pays workers the
unit wage Wt, sells its un–depreciated capital (1 − δ)Kt(j) at price Pt, and pays (or receives)
Pt(1 + rct )|Kt(j) −Kt| to the lenders (from borrowers). Since firm j distributes its revenues as
dividends PtDt(j) (see relation (2)), one obtains
PtDt(j) = ptAt(ωt(j)Kt(j))αNt(j)1−α −WtNt(j)+(1−δ)PtKt(j)−Pt(1+rct )(Kt(j)−Kt) (15)
for all j ∈ [0, 1]. Implicit in (15) is the assumption that capital depreciates at the same rate δ
(or must be maintained at the same cost) when firm j does not produce —i.e. keeps its capital
stock idle— as when it does.13 Using (7), (8), and (12)–(15), one can express firm j’s real rate








− (rct + δ)
Kt(j) −Kt
Kt
− δ ∀j ∈ [0, 1] (16)
The objective of firm j is to maximize rqt (j) with respect to Nt(j) and Kt(j). We study the
maximization problem of unproductive and productive firms in turn.
12Hence, Kt = (1 − δ)Kt−1 + It−1. Given that firms live only one period, note that the inter–temporal decisions
regarding capital accumulation within the intermediate good sector are, in effect, taken by the household —their
shareholder.
13This assumption simply implies that the marginal return on capital of a productive firm is always strictly
higher than that of an unproductive firm, as relation (22) shows.
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Choices of an Unproductive Firm j ∈ Ωut . In this case, firm j does not produce and
chooses Nt(j) = 0, which implies (using (16))
rqt (j) = rct − (rct + δ)
Kt(j)
Kt
∀j ∈ Ωut (17)
An unproductive firm’s choice boils down to either keeping capital idle, which returns −δ, or
selling its capital to other firms and lending out the proceeds, which returns rct . When rct > −δ,
it is optimal for the firm to sell its entire capital stock, and Kt(j) = 0. When rct = −δ, the firm
is indifferent. When rct < −δ, the firm keeps capital idle. Since unproductive firms all take the
same decisions, one obtains
Kt(j) = Kut and Nt(j) = 0 and yt(j) = 0 ∀j ∈ Ωut (18)
and
rqt (j) = r
q
u,t = rct − (rct + δ)
Kut
Kt
∀j ∈ Ωut (19)
where Kut and r
q
u,t denote the adjusted capital stock and real rate of return on equity of an
unproductive firm.
Choices of a Productive Firm j ∈ Ωpt . In this case, firm j’s optimal labor demand satisfies
the first order condition
Wt
Pt
= (1 − α)yt(j)(1 − τ)MtNt(j)














where Φt denotes the marginal product of capital for a productive firm. The last term in relation
(20) emphasizes that Φt is a function of the real wage Wt/Pt and retailers’ markup Mt and is,
therefore, taken as given by firm j. Using (20), firm j’s real rate of return on equity in (16)
rewrites as










− δ > −δ (22)
denotes the marginal return on capital (net of depreciation) for a productive firm. Relation (21)
implies that firm j is willing to purchase as much capital as possible if rct < rkt , is indifferent
between purchasing and selling capital if rct = rkt , and sells its entire capital stock and lends the
proceeds if rct > rkt . Since productive firms all take the same decisions, one obtains
Kt(j) = Kpt and Nt(j) = N
p
t and yt(j) = y
p




rqt (j) = r
q





∀j ∈ Ωpt (24)




t , and r
q
p,t denote the adjusted capital stock, labour demand, output, and real
rate of return on equity of a productive firm.
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2.2 Market Clearing
We first consider the benchmark case of a frictionless credit market, where the idiosyncratic
productivity shocks can be observed by all potential investors, and where financial contracts are
fully enforceable, with no constraint on the amount that a firm can borrow. Then, we introduce
financial frictions.
2.2.1 Frictionless Credit Market
Absent financial frictions, productive firms will borrow and purchase capital until they break
even, so that (from (24)) rqp,t = rct = rkt > −δ. In this case, Kut = 0, the mass µ of unproductive
firms sell their entire capital stock Kt to the mass 1 − µ of productive ones,
Kpt =
Kt
1 − µ (25)
and rqu,t = r
q
p,t (from (19)). As the credit market perfectly hedges firms against idiosyncratic
shocks and all capital goods are used productively, the model boils down to the textbook NK
model with a representative intermediate goods firm.
2.2.2 Frictional Credit Market
Next, consider the case of financial frictions arising from limited commitment and asymmetric
information. We assume that a firm that keeps its capital idle and sells it at the end of the
period has the possibility to abscond with the proceeds of the sale. Since a firm may borrow,
purchase more capital, and abscond, it cannot commit itself to paying back its debt.14 We also
assume that investors do not observe a given firm j’s productivity ωt(j), and hence cannot assess
its incentives to borrow and default. As we show next, these frictions put an upper bound on
the leverage of any individual firm.15
Suppose that an unproductive firm were to mimic a productive firm by borrowing and
purchasing Kpt − Kt ≥ 0 capital goods, and then keep its capital stock idle, resell it at the
end of the period, and default. Its implied payoff would be Pt(1 − δ)Kpt . That firm will not
abscond as long as this payoff is smaller than the return, Pt(1 + rct )Kt, from selling its entire
capital stock and lending the proceeds —which is its best alternative option. Hence the incentive
14The assumption here is that the proceeds from the sales of capital goods at the end of period t can only be
concealed if the capital goods have not been used for production. One can think of the firms that produce and
sell intermediate goods as firms that operate transparently, and whose revenues can easily be seized by creditors.
In contrast, the firms that keep their capital idle have the possibility to “go underground” and default, which
limits the enforceability of financial contracts.
15The opportunity cost of absconding is higher for productive than for unproductive firms, which therefore have
more incentive to default. Since firm productivity is private information and unproductive firms may pretend
they are productive, productive firms can only commit themselves to paying back their debt if they limit its
amount. Such a combination of limited contract enforcement and asymmetric information is standard in the
macro–finance literature (Gertler and Rogoff (1990), Azariadis and Smith (1998), Boissay, Collard, and Smets
(2016)) and needed here to occasionally cause the credit market to freeze, and hence the model economy to depart
from the standard NK economy. Without asymmetric information, unproductive firms would sell their entire
capital stock to productive firms. Without limited enforcement, productive firms could borrow and purchase
capital until they break even, as in the frictionless credit market case.
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compatibility constraint that ensures that no firm defaults is
Pt(1 − δ)Kpt ≤ Pt(1 + rct )Kt =⇒
Kpt −Kt
Kt
≤ ψt ≡ max
{
rct + δ
1 − δ , 0
}
(26)
where ψt is the firm’s maximum leverage ratio. As long as condition (26) is satisfied, unproductive
firms will refrain from borrowing and defaulting. Importantly, the borrowing limit ψt increases
with rct : the higher the loan rate, the higher unproductive firms’ opportunity cost of absconding,
and hence the higher productive firms’ incentive–compatible leverage.
Supply and Demand Schedules. Given relations (19) and (26), unproductive firms’ aggre-
gate credit supply, denoted LS(rct ), reads:
LS(rct ) = µ (Kt −Kut ) =

µKt for rct > −δ
[0, µKt] for rct = −δ
0 for rct < −δ
When rct > −δ, the mass µ of unproductive firms sell their capital stock Kt and lend the proceeds
on the credit market, implying LS(rct ) = µKt. When rct = −δ, they are indifferent between
lending or keeping their capital idle, implying LS(rct ) ∈ [0, µKt]. When rct < −δ, they keep their
capital stock Kt idle: LS(rct ) = 0. Similarly, productive firms’ aggregate credit demand, denoted
LD(rct ), is given by (using (24) and (26)):




−(1 − µ)Kt for rct > rkt
[−(1 − µ)Kt, (1 − µ)ψtKt] for rct = rkt
(1 − µ)ψtKt for rct < rkt
The 1 − µ productive firms borrow only if the net return from expanding their capital stock
is positive. When rct > rkt , they prefer to sell their capital and lend the proceeds rather than
borrow: LD(rct ) = −(1 − µ)Kt. When rct = rkt , they are indifferent but may each borrow up to
ψt, implying (using (26)) LD(rct ) ∈ [−(1 − µ)Kt, (1 − µ)ψtKt]. When rct < rkt , they borrow up
to the limit: LD(rct ) = (1 − µ)ψtKt.
Credit Market Equilibrium. Figure 1 depicts the credit supply and demand schedules.
Panel (a) corresponds to a situation where there is a range of interest rates for which demand
exceeds supply, such that
lim
rct ↗rkt
LD (rct ) ≥ lim
rct ↗rkt
LS (rct ) ⇐⇒ rkt ≥ r̄k ≡
µ− δ
1 − µ (27)
where r̄k denotes the minimum return on investment that guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium with trade.16 When condition (27) holds, productive firms can afford paying the
required loan rate, and there exist three possible equilibria, denoted by E, U , and A in Figure 1.
16This threshold can also be seen as the minimum loan rate that is required to permit and entice every
unproductive firm to lend on the credit market —rather than borrow and default.
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In what follows, we focus on equilibria A and E which, unlike U , are stable under tatônnement.17
When (27) does not hold, A is the only possible equilibrium. We describe equilibria A and E in
turn.































Note: This figure illustrates unproductive firms’ aggregate supply on the credit market (black) and productive firms’
incentive–compatible aggregate credit demand (gray) curves. In Panel (a), the demand curve is associated with a value of
rkt strictly above r̄k and multiple equilibria A, E, and U . In this case, U and A are ruled out on the ground that they are
unstable (for U) and Pareto–dominated (for A). In Panel (b), the demand curve is associated with a value of rkt strictly
below r̄k and A as unique equilibrium. The threshold for the loan rate, r̄k, is constant and corresponds to the minimum
incentive–compatible loan rate that is required to ensure that every unproductive firm sells its entire capital stock and lends
the proceeds.
Consider equilibrium A (for “Autarky”), where rct = −δ. At that rate, unproductive firms are
indifferent as lending, and therefore any supply of funds within the interval [0, µKt] is consistent
with optimal firm behavior. However, the incentive compatible amount of funds that can be
borrowed at that rate is zero (ψt = 0). As a result, LD(−δ) = LS(−δ) = 0 and there is no trade.
In what follows, we refer to this autarkic equilibrium as a “financial crisis”.
Equilibrium E, in contrast, features a loan rate rct = rkt ≥ r̄k > −δ, at which every
unproductive firm sells capital to productive firms, as if there were no financial frictions. In
that case, we have Kpt = Kt/(1 − µ) (see relation (25)). We refer to this equilibrium as “normal
times”.
Finally, consider what happens when productive firms’ return on capital, rkt , falls below the
threshold r̄k, so that condition (27) is not satisfied anymore. This is illustrated in Panel (b) of
Figure 1. In this case, the range of loan rates for which LD(rct ) > LS(rct ) vanishes altogether,
and only the autarkic equilibrium A survives.
17We rule out equilibrium U because it is not tatônnement–stable. An equilibrium rate rct is tatônnement–stable
if, following any small perturbation to rct , a standard adjustment process —whereby the loan rate goes up (down)
whenever there is excess demand (supply) of credit — pulls rct back to its equilibrium value (see Mas-Colell,
Whinston, and Green (1995), Chapter 17). Since firms take rct as given, tatônnement stability is the relevant
concept of equilibrium stability. Note nonetheless that U and E yield the same aggregate outcome and same





In the rest of the paper, we assume that when equilibria A and E coexist, market participants
coordinate on the most efficient one, namely, equilibrium E.18 As a result, a crisis breaks out if
and only if A is the only possible equilibrium, i.e. if and only if (27) does not hold.
2.2.3 Other Markets










yt(j)dj = (1 − µ)ypt (28)
2.3 Equilibrium Outcome
The level of aggregate output depends on the equilibrium of the credit market. In normal times,
the entire capital stock of the economy is used productively and, given Kt and Nt, aggregate
output is the same as in an economy without financial frictions (in our case, the textbook NK
economy):
Yt = AtKαt N1−αt (29)
In crisis times, in contrast, unproductive firms keep their capital idle, only a fraction 1 − µ the
economy’s aggregate capital stock is used productively, and aggregate productivity falls. For the
same Kt and Nt, output is therefore lower than in normal times:
Yt = At ((1 − µ)Kt)αN1−αt (30)
Even though in normal times aggregate productivity and output are the same as in an
economy with a frictionless credit market given Kt and Nt, note that the latter (and therefore
output) will in general differ between the two economies. The reason is that the household and
retailers respectively tend to accumulate precautionary savings and raise markups to compensate
for the fall in consumption and productivity should a crisis break out —hence the difference
between the two economies. The mere anticipation of a crisis thus induces the economy to
drift away from the economy without financial frictions. Whether a crisis is imminent can be












where 1 {·} is a dummy variable equal to one when the inequality inside the curly braces holds
(i.e. there is a crisis) and to zero otherwise.
18There are of course several —but less parsimonious— ways to select the equilibrium. For example, one could
introduce a sunspot, e.g. assume that firms coordinate on equilibrium E (i.e. are “optimistic”) with some constant
and exogenous probability whenever this equilibrium exists. It should be clear, however, that the central element
of our analysis is condition (27) for the existence of E, not the selection of E conditional on its existence. In other
terms, our analysis does not hinge on the equilibrium selection mechanism that we assume.
19Expression (31) combines relations (20), (22), (23), (27), and (28), and the result that Kpt = Kt/(1 − µ) in
normal times.
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Expression (31) makes clear that crises may emerge through a fall in aggregate output (the
“Y–channel”), a rise in retailers’ markup (the “M–channel”), or excess capital accumulation (the
“K–channel”). For example, given a (predetermined) capital stock Kt, a crisis is more likely to
break out following a shock that lowers output and/or increases the markup. Such a shock does
not need to be large to trigger a crisis, if the economy has accumulated a large enough capital
stock. Indeed, when Kt is high, all other things equal, productive firms’ marginal return on
capital is low, and the credit market is fragile. As we show later, this may happen towards the
end of an unusually long economic boom. In this case, even a modest change in Yt or Mt may
trigger a crisis.
As the above discussion suggests, the central bank can affect the probability of a crisis
both in the short and in the medium run. In the short run, it does so through the effect of
contemporaneous changes in its policy rate on output and inflation (the Y– and M–channels).
For example, assume that the central bank unexpectedly raises its policy rate. On impact,
all other things equal, the hike works to reduce aggregate demand and to increase retailers’
markups. As a result, firms’ marginal return on capital diminishes, which brings the economy
closer to a crisis (as shown in expression (31)). In the medium run, in contrast, monetary policy
affects financial stability through its impact on the household’s saving behavior and capital
accumulation (the K–channel). For example, a central bank that commits itself to systematically
and forcefully responding to fluctuations in output (i.e. to a high ϕy) will typically slow down
capital accumulation during booms.
3 Anatomy of a Financial Crisis
Our model features various types of crises, whose origins may a priori range from an extreme
exogenous adverse technology shock to an endogenous and protracted investment boom.20 The
aim of this section is to describe the “average” dynamics around financial crises under a realistic
parametrization of the model. As we shall see, the average crisis is in effect a mix of the above
two polar types of crises.
3.1 Parametrization of the Model
We parameterize our model based on quarterly data (see Table 1) in the presence of aggregate
TFP shocks and under Taylor (1993)’s original monetary policy rule (i.e. with ϕπ = 1.5 and
ϕy = 0.5/4).21 The standard parameters of the model take the usual values. The utility function
is logarithmic with respect to consumption (σ = 1). The parameters of labor dis–utility are
set to χ = 0.814 and φ = 0.5 so as to normalize hours to one in the deterministic steady state
and to obtain an inverse Frish labor elasticity of 2 —this is in the ballpark of the estimates
20The stylized graphical representation of the optimal capital accumulation decision rule in Figure 7.2 in the
appendix illustrates these polar cases.
21In addition to supply shocks, one could naturally also consider demand shocks. One can show that, with
a standard parametrization, the presence of demand shocks would affect neither the main tradeoffs relating to
financial stability nor our main results. For the sake of parsimony, we therefore work with productivity shocks
only and relegate the analysis with both shocks to the appendix (see Section 7.5).
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for industrialized countries. We set the discount factor to β = 0.989, which corresponds to an
annualized average return on financial assets of about 4%. The elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods ϵ is set to 10, which generates a markup of 11% in the steady state. Given
this, we set the capital elasticity parameter α to 0.36 in order to obtain a labor income share of
64% in the steady state. We assume that capital depreciates by 6% per year (δ = 0.015). We set
the price adjustment cost parameter to ϱ = 105, so that the model generates the same slope of
the Phillips curve as in a Calvo pricing model with an average duration of prices of 4 quarters.




β 4% annual real interest rate 0.989
σ Logarithmic utility on consumption 1.000
φ Inverse Frish elasticity equals 2 0.500
χ Steady state hours equal 1 0.814
Technology and price setting
α 64% labor share 0.360
δ 6% annual capital depreciation rate 0.015
ϱ Slope of the Phillips curve as with Calvo price setting 105.000
ϵ 11% markup rate 10.000
Aggregate TFP shocks
ρa Persistence 0.950
σa Standard deviation of innovations (in %) 0.700
Interest rate rule
ϕπ Standard quarterly Taylor rule (Taylor (1993)) 1.500
ϕy 0.125
Proportion of unproductive firms
µ The economy spends 8% of the time in a crisis 0.0242
Compared to the textbook NK model, there is only one additional parameter: the proportion
of unproductive firms µ. This parameter implicitly governs the degree of asymmetric information
and, therefore, the prevalence of financial frictions. Our model nests the textbook NK model,
which corresponds to the case when µ = 0. All other things equal, the higher µ, the higher the
required minimum loan rate r̄k (see relation (27)) and the higher the probability of a crisis. We
set µ = 2.42% so that the economy spends 8% of the time in a crisis in the stochastic steady
state, which matches existing data on financial crises.22
22In Reinhart and Rogoff (2014), Laeven and Valencia (2018), and Baron, Verner, and Xiong (2020), for example,
countries spend 6% to 12% of the time in a crisis. The gap is due to differences in the definition of a crisis, the
identification of the starting and ending dates, and the country coverage. The combination of these three data
sets over the period 1980–2017 (38 years) and 60 countries yields 110 financial crises of about seven quarters on
average. It follows that a country spends on average 110×7/(60×38×4)≃ 8% of the time in a crisis.
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3.2 Average Dynamics Around Crises
To derive the dynamics around the typical crisis, we proceed in two steps. First, we numerically
solve our non–linear model using a global method.23 Second, starting from the stochastic steady
state, we feed the model with the productivity shocks, simulate it over 1,000,000 periods, and
identify the crises’ starting dates as well as the sequences of shocks around them. We then
compute the average dynamics 20 quarters around these dates.24 The results are reported in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: Average Dynamics Around Crises
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Note: Simulations for the TR93 economy. Average dynamics of the economy around the beginning of a crisis
(in quarter 0). To filter out the potential noise due to the aftershocks of past crises, we only report averages
for new crises, i.e. crises that follow at least 20 quarters of normal times. The dashed line corresponds to the
unconditional average across simulation.
The main insight from the analysis is that the average crisis occurs on the heels of a protracted
economic boom (Figure 2, Panels (b) and (f)) driven by a long sequence of relatively small
positive technology shocks (Panel (a)). Throughout the boom, the economy accumulates capital
(Panel (b)), which over time gradually exerts downward pressures on productive firms’ marginal
return on capital (Panel (h)). At first, these pressures are more than compensated by the
23Our model cannot be solved linearly because of discontinuities in the decision rules. It cannot be solved
locally because crises may break out when the economy is far away from its steady state (e.g. when Kt is high).
Details on the numerical solution method are provided in Section 7.7 in the appendix.
24Further note that the average dynamics mask the heterogeneity and multiple causes of financial crises in our
model, which can generate different types of crises, ranging from “exogenous” ones —due to large adverse shocks—
to “endogenous” ones —due to an investment boom. See Section 7.2 for a discussion.
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productivity gains, the credit market reallocates capital effectively to the most productive firms,
and the probability of a crisis is relatively small (Panel (c)). As the sequence of favorable TFP
shocks runs its course, productivity recedes and output falls back toward its steady state, leaving
firms with excess capital. As a result, firms’ marginal return on capital goes down (Panel (h))
and the probability of a crisis goes up (Panel (c)). The crisis eventually breaks out in the face of
an adverse shock (of about three standard deviations) that lowers TFP by around 1.5% (about
two standard deviations) below its steady state (Panel (a)). Note that this shock is not the
only cause of the crisis, in the sense that the same shock would not have led to a crisis, had the
capital stock been lower in the first place.25 As condition (31) suggests, a capital overhang is
indeed a pre–condition for a financial crisis to break out without an extreme shock. The crisis is
characterized by the collapse of the credit market, capital misallocation, a recession (Panel (f)),
and inflationary pressures (Panel (e)).26
The reason why crises break out even though they lead to an inefficient outcome is that
neither the household nor retailers internalize the effects of their individual choices on financial
fragility. To hedge against the future recession and smooth consumption, the household tends to
accumulate savings, which contributes to increasing capital even further above what would be
necessary to avert the crisis. Boissay, Collard, and Smets (2016) refer to this phenomenon as a
“the savings glut” externality. Similarly, retailers anticipate that productivity will fall and that
prices will rise during the crisis (Panel (e)). To smooth their menu costs over time, they therefore
tend to front–load their price increases ahead of the crisis, which contributes to maintaining
high markups and further fosters financial fragility.27 The upshot is that anticipating the crisis
paradoxically induces agents to precipitate —rather than avert— it. These externalities call for
policy intervention, which we study next.
4 The “Divine Coincidence” Revisited
We now study whether central banks should account for financial stability risks when setting their
policy rate. To do so, we compare welfare under different Taylor–type rules with that under SIT.
25Note that the average dynamics around crises in Figure 2 mask the heterogeneity of financial crises in our
model, and notably the prevalence of boom–driven crises over shock–driven ones. For a detailed discussion, see
Section 7.2 of the appendix.
26In a crisis, the adverse TFP shock and capital misallocation both entail aggregate productivity losses and
inflationary pressures, which prompt the central bank to raise its policy rate. The latter result is an artifact of
TFP shocks being the only aggregate shocks in the economy. One can show that, in an economy with both TFP
and demand shocks, the average crisis is triggered by both types of shock, and that the fall in aggregate demand
during a crisis mitigates the inflationary pressures. In such an economy, the central bank following TR93 would
lower its policy rate during a crisis. For more details, see Section 7.5 in the appendix.
27These “markup externalities” come on the top of the usual aggregate demand externalities (Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987)) and are due to the presence of financial frictions. Figure 7.4 in the appendix illustrates the
incidence of the savings glut and markup externalities under a standard Taylor rule. The experiment consists
in comparing the dynamics of capital and markups before the average crisis, i.e. between quarters -20 and -1,
with their dynamics in an economy without financial frictions —and fed with the very same shocks. The latter
counterfactual dynamics indicate how capital and markups would have evolved absent financial frictions. Since
the credit market functions equally well in the two economies between quarters -20 and -1, the difference pins
down the pure effect of crisis expectations. The bottom panels of Figure 7.4 show that the differences are positive,
which means that capital and markups increase by more during the boom when the household and retailers
anticipate a crisis.
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We use SIT as benchmark because, in the absence of financial frictions, this rule concomitantly
eliminates inefficient fluctuations in the output gap —the so–called “divine coincidence”— and
is optimal (Blanchard and Gaĺı (2007)).28 We are interested in whether the central bank should
depart from this benchmark in an environment where the credit market is fragile.
As a first step, we establish that SIT does not deliver the first best allocation in that
environment, as the welfare loss under SIT amounts to 0.11% in terms of consumption equivalent
variation (CEV), as shown in Table 2 (column “CEVF B”). Since the distortions due to sticky
prices are fully neutralized under SIT, these welfare losses are entirely due to the cost of financial
crises.
Table 2: Economic Performance and Welfare under Alternative Policy Rules
Frictionless Frictional credit market
CEVSIT CEVSIT CEVF B Crisis Length Output E(π2t )
Rule ϕy (%) (%) (%) time (%) (quarter) loss (%)












0.025 -0.0000 -0.0072 -0.1198 10.47 5.94 -5.75 0.0004
0.050 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.1137 9.87 5.80 -5.53 0.0012
0.125 -0.0009 0.0160 -0.0964 [8.00] 5.31 -4.94 0.0064
0.250 -0.0037 0.0415 -0.0706 5.00 4.58 -4.24 0.0200
0.500 -0.0116 0.0652 -0.0466 1.39 3.64 -3.16 0.0516
0.750 -0.0197 0.0649 -0.0467 0.45 4.49 -2.45 0.0817
Note: Statistics of the stochastic steady state ergodic distribution. “Crisis time” is the percentage of the time that
the economy spends in a crisis (in %). “Length” is the average duration of a crisis (in quarters). “Output loss” is
the percentage fall in output from one quarter before the crisis until the trough of the crisis (in %). The columns
under CEVSIT report the welfare gain (loss, if negative) relative to SIT under each alternative rule considered,
expressed in terms of the percent consumption equivalent variation (CEV). Similarly, the column under CEVF B
reports the welfare loss relative to the First Best. The frictionless credit market economy corresponds to a case
where µ = 0 —all else equal. In the case of the standard Taylor rule (case with ϕy = 0.125), the economy spends
by construction 8% of the time in a crisis (square brackets; see Section 3.1).
Can welfare be raised by following a monetary policy rule other than SIT? If so, this will
necessarily come at the cost of deviating from price stability, implying a tradeoff between
price and financial stability. To study this question, we report in Table 2 the statistics on the
incidence of crises and price volatility in the stochastic steady state of the economy, when the
central bank follows Taylor–type rules that differ in terms of the response to fluctuations in
output, i.e. parameter ϕy in relation (1). On the one hand, responding more aggressively to
output significantly reduces the time spent in a crisis, from 9.85% under SIT to 0.45% under a
Taylor–type rule with ϕy = 0.75 (column “Crisis time”). On the other hand, inflation is more
volatile as ϕy goes up (last column). All in all, we find that responding to output improves
welfare, provided that the central bank responds “enough”. For example, permanent consumption
is 0.016% higher under TR93 than under SIT (column “CEVSIT ”, third and fourth rows). This
28The comparison of welfare under the various policy rules in the absence of financial frictions in Table 2
(column “Frictionless credit market”) illustrates this established result.
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contrasts with the case of frictionless credit markets, where attaching a larger weight to output
stabilization is associated with a reduction in welfare (column “CEVSIT ” in the case of the
frictionless credit market).
To gain intuition for the above results, we start by analyzing the effects of monetary policy
on the probability of a crisis. As already noted, monetary policy plays out in the medium as
well as in the short run. In the medium run, leaning against investment booms helps reduce the
probability of a crisis by reining in the buildup of macro–financial imbalances.
Figure 3: Medium Run Effects: Counterfactual Booms








































(d) Marginal Return on Capital
(Annualized, in %)
SIT ϕy = 0.125 (TR93) ϕy=0.25
Notes: For SIT: average dynamics around crises. For the two Taylor–type rules with ϕy = 0.125 (TR93) or
ϕy = 0.25: counterfactual average dynamics, when the economy starts with the same capital stock in quarter
t = −20 and is fed with the same technology shocks as the SIT economy (Panel (a)).
Figure 3 illustrates this point by comparing the average dynamics around crises under SIT
with the average dynamics of the economies under Taylor–type rules, when the latter are fed
with the very same sequences of shocks as those leading to a crisis under SIT (Panel (a)). These
counterfactual dynamics show that capital would have been accumulated more slowly had the
central bank followed —all else equal— these rules instead of SIT (Panel (b)). The reason
is twofold. First, there is the usual effect of the expected rate of return of capital on capital
accumulation. As the central bank commits itself to curbing growth, it also lowers investors’
expected returns during booms and thus makes capital investment less attractive. Second, by
smoothing the business cycle, such a policy in effect provides the household with an insurance
against future aggregate shocks, and helps them smooth their consumption. This, in turn,
reduces the need for precautionary savings and contributes to slowing down the accumulation of
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capital during expansions, making the economy more resilient. The upshot is that a monetary
policy rule with a higher ϕy may lower the probability of a crisis. Because capital accumulation
takes time, though, these effects only materialize over multiple years.
Monetary policy also affects the probability of a crisis through its short run macro–stabilization
properties. Indeed recall that the average crisis is triggered by a standard adverse technology
shock. Following such a shock, output falls by less and retailers’ markups fall by more under a
Taylor–type rule than under SIT, propping up firms’ marginal return on capital.29 All else equal,
the economy is therefore more resilient when the central bank mitigates to the fall in output.
Figure 4: The Price Versus Financial Stability Tradeofff
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0











(a) Fraction of Time Spent in Crisis
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0







(b) E[ 2t ]
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0














Notes: Panel (a): Time spent in a crisis (in %, y–axis), as parameter ϕy increases (x–axis), for three different
loadings on inflation: ϕπ = 1.25, 1.5, 2. Panel (c): Permanent consumption equivalent increase (CEVSIT , in %)
that the household should be given to live in the SIT economy rather than in an economy with the Taylor–type
rule considered. A positive welfare gain means that welfare is higher in the TR than in the SIT economy. The
black dot corresponds to our baseline calibration —where the economy spends 8% of the time in a crisis.
Last, we are interested in how hard the central bank should lean. The comparison between
the last two rows of Table 2 shows that welfare is slightly lower with ϕy = 0.75 than with
ϕy = 0.5, suggesting that the marginal welfare gain from leaning is decreasing. To understand
this result, we present in Figure 4 the effects of raising ϕy on price and financial stability when
the central bank follows a Taylor–type rule. For completeness, we also experiment with three
different values of ϕπ. Consider the baseline case with ϕπ = 1.5 first. As ϕy increases, the central
bank stabilizes output and reduces the percentage of time in a crisis which has a positive first
order effect on welfare. At the same time, raising ϕy works to increase the volatility of markups,
as reflected in the increase in the volatility of inflation (Panel (b)). For values of ϕy > 0.6, the
latter effect more than offsets the welfare gains associated with financial stability (Panel (c)).
The above price versus financial stability tradeoff is even starker when the central bank
responds only mildly to inflation. When ϕπ = 1.25 (dotted line), for example, markup volatility
increases faster with ϕy than in the baseline case (Panel (b)). One implication is that the
percentage of time the economy spends in a crisis at first falls with ϕy until ϕy ≈ 0.55 and then
increases with ϕy beyond that threshold (Panel (a), dotted line). This is because, as ϕy goes up
29Recall that, around the steady state, our model essentially boils down to the textbook NK model with capital
accumulation and, therefore, that the response of the economy to small shocks is standard. Figure 7.5 in the
appendix, which compares the impulse responses to a negative one–standard deviation technology shock under
SIT versus Taylor–type rules, illustrates this point.
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and the central bank leans harder during booms, the financial stability gain from slower capital
accumulation (K–channel) gets more than offset by the financial stability loss due to higher
markups (M–channel). It follows that, beyond a certain level (here around ϕy ≈ 0.3), leaning
“too hard” may undermine both price and financial stability, and overall reduce welfare (Panel
(c), dotted line).
5 Alternative Monetary Policy Strategies
5.1 Monetary Policy Discretion and Financial Instability
In his narrative of the GFC, Taylor (2011) argues that discretionary and loose monetary policy
may have exposed the economy to financial stability risks —the “Great Deviation” view. This
section revisits this narrative and assesses the potential detrimental effects of monetary shocks
—as opposed to rules— on financial stability. To do so, we consider a TR93 economy that
experiences random deviations from the policy rule —“monetary policy shocks”— and where
these shocks are the only source of aggregate uncertainty. More specifically, we consider a
monetary policy rule of the form









with two alternatives exogenous processes for the monetary policy shock ςt. One is an AR(1)
process ln(ςt) = ρς ln(ςt−1) + ϵςt , with ρς = 0.5 and σς = 0.0025, as in Gaĺı (2015). The other is a
random independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) shock that has the same volatility. We
are interested in the dynamics of monetary policy shocks around crises in this new environment.
Figure 5: Rates Too Low for Too Long May Lead to a Crisis
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The results, reported in Figure 5, show that the average crisis breaks out following a long
period of unexpected monetary easing (Panel (a)) that feeds an investment boom (Panel (b)).
In other words, by keeping the policy rate too low for too long, the central bank feeds macro–
financial imbalances, leading the economy to a crisis. Moreover, the crisis is triggered by three
consecutive periods of unwarranted (according to the rule) and abrupt interest rate hikes toward
the end of the boom in the case of the persistent shock and a one–off 60 basis point jolt in the
21
case of the i.i.d. shock. This latter finding is consistent with recent empirical evidence that
unanticipated “last minute” interest rate hikes at the end of a boom are more likely to trigger a
crisis than to avert it (Schularick, Ter Steege, and Ward (2021)). Overall, our analysis highlights
that discretionary monetary policy may be a source of financial instability.
5.2 Monetary Policy as Backstop
Should the central bank systematically backstop the credit market during financial distress
episodes? This section aims at evaluating the potential welfare gains from this type of policy.
More precisely, we consider non–linear interest rate rules whereby the central bank commits
itself to following SIT or a Taylor–type rule in normal times but also to doing whatever it takes
whenever needed —and therefore exceptionally deviating from these rules— to forestall a crisis.
In those instances, we assume that the central bank deviates “just enough” to avert the crisis,
i.e. sets its policy rate so that rkt = r̄k (see condition (27)).30 We refer to such a contingent,
non–linear rule as a “backstop” rule.31
Figure 6: Backstop Interventions Required to Stave off a Crisis
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Notes: Average deviations from the normal times’ policy rule that the central bank must commit itself to and
implement in order to forestall financial crises. Panel (a): deviation of the policy rate, in basis points, when the
central bank otherwise follows TR93. Panel (b): deviation of the inflation target from zero, in percentage point,
when the central bank otherwise follows SIT.
As a first step, we show in Figure 6 the average deviations from TR93 (Panel (a)) and SIT
(Panel (b)) that are needed in order to stave off a crisis. These deviations are reported in terms
of the policy rate (in basis points) for TR93 and in terms of the annualized inflation rate (in
percentage points) for SIT. In both cases, the central bank must loosen its policy compared
to normal times, which means to lower its policy rate by 20bps below TR93 or momentarily
tolerate a 0.6pp higher inflation rate under SIT.
Next, we compare the welfare gain of following a backstop rule. The welfare results, reported
in Table 3, are directly comparable with those in Table 2. Two findings stand out. First,




ςt, for example, this consists in setting the
term ςt = 1 if rkt ≥ r̄k, and setting ςt such that rkt = r̄k whenever rkt would otherwise be lower than r̄k. Likewise,
in the SIT case, the central bank tolerates deviations from strict inflation targeting just enough so that rkt = r̄k.
31Our notion of backstopping is related to, but different from, the notion of “cleaning”, whereby the central
bank mitigates the effects of a crisis only once it broke out.
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backstopping the economy improves welfare significantly over SIT (column “CEVSIT ”) and,
depending on the policy rule, may almost entirely eliminate the welfare cost of financial crises
(column “CEVF B”). In the case of the SIT rule (first row), for instance, the household should be
given 0.11% more permanent consumption for living in an economy without, rather than with,
backstopping —which essentially corresponds to the welfare cost of crises reported in Table 2.
More generally, relative to the first best allocation, the overall welfare loss in the backstopped
economies is negligible (around 0.001%) in the case of SIT and TR93.32
Table 3: Economic Performance and Welfare Under Backstop Policies (BP)
CEVSIT CEVF B BP time Length E(π2t )
Rule ϕy (%) (%) (%) (quarter)












0.025 0.1103 -0.0012 17.99 9.17 0.0011
0.050 0.1102 -0.0013 16.30 8.70 0.0017
0.125 0.1096 -0.0019 11.81 7.45 0.0063
0.250 0.1071 -0.0044 6.30 5.93 0.0196
0.500 0.0998 -0.0117 1.38 4.43 0.0196
0.750 0.0918 -0.0196 0.37 5.11 0.0821
Note: Statistics of the stochastic steady state ergodic distribution. “BP time” is the percentage of the time that
central bank must backstop the economy (in %). “Length” is the average duration of the backstop policy (in
quarters). The column under CEVSIT reports the welfare gain (loss, if negative) relative to SIT under each of the
backstop policy considered, expressed in terms of the percent consumption equivalent variation (CEV). Similarly,
the column under CEVF B reports the welfare loss relative to the First Best.
Second, the financial sector is paradoxically more fragile when the central bank commits
itself to backstopping the economy. Under SIT, for instance, the central bank has to backstop
the economy —and therefore deviate from its normal times policy rule— slightly more than
15% of the time, whereas without backstop the economy would spend less than 10% of the time
in a crisis (compare the column “BP time” with the column “Crisis time” in Table 2). This
greater fragility is due to backstopping episodes being both more likely and more persistent
(column “Length”) than crisis episodes (column “Length” in Table 2). Indeed, when the central
bank backstops the economy, it eliminates the negative wealth effects associated with financial
crises. All else equal, the capital stock thus tends to be on average higher in that case, which
makes the credit market more vulnerable than in an economy without backstop. Moreover, when
the central bank intervenes to stave off a crisis, it also slows down the downward adjustment
of capital that would be necessary to eliminate the existing imbalances. As a result, financial
distress lasts longer and requires the central bank to intervene over around two years in the case
of SIT and TR93.
32In the case of the Taylor–type rules, welfare decreases with ϕy because, when the central bank backstops the
economy, there is little benefit from leaning against investment booms in normal times. In this case, it is desirable
that the central bank follow a rule that addresses the welfare cost of nominal rigidities in normal times —very
much like in the standard NK model.
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6 Conclusion
What are the channels through which monetary policy affects financial stability? Should central
banks deviate from their objective of price stability to promote financial stability? To what extent
may monetary policy itself brew financial vulnerabilities? To address these questions, we have
extended the textbook NK model with capital accumulation, heterogeneous firms, and a credit
market that allows the economy to reallocate capital efficiently across firms. Absent frictions on
the credit market, the equilibrium outcome boils down to that of the standard model with a
representative firm. With financial frictions, in contrast, there is an upper bound on the leverage
ratio of any individual firm resulting from an incentive–compatibility constraint, which prevents
capital from being fully reallocated to the most efficient firms. When the average return on
capital is too low, possibly due to a capital overhang at the end of a long boom, the credit
market collapses, triggering a financial crisis and a fall in activity due to capital misallocation.
We show that conventional monetary policy affects financial stability through three main
channels: in the short run, through its effects on aggregate demand and markups, and in the
medium run, through its effects on capital accumulation. We also show that, by deviating from
strict inflation targeting and systematically leaning against investment booms, the central bank
may not only reduce the probability of a crisis but also improve welfare. Finally, we show that
discretionary monetary policy actions, such as keeping policy rates too low for too long and then
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7.1 Frictionless Credit Market Equilibrium
Figure 7.1 presents unproductive firms’ aggregate credit supply (black) and productive firms’
incentive–compatible aggregate demand (gray) curves in the absence of financial frictions (see
Section 2.2.1). In this case, equilibrium E is unique and, given rkt , the same as equilibrium E
that would prevail in normal times in the presence of financial frictions (see Figure 1, panel (a)).








Note: This figure illustrates unproductive firms’ aggregate credit supply (black) and
productive firms’ aggregate loan demand (gray) curves, in the absence of financial
frictions.
7.2 Financial Crises: Polar Types and Multiple Causes
Figure 7.2 is a stylized representation of the optimal capital accumulation decision rule, which
expresses Kt+1 as a function of state variables Kt and At. During a crisis, the household dis–saves
to consume, which generates less investment and a fall in the capital stock, as captured by the
discontinuous downward breaks in the decision rules. There are two polar types of crises. The
first one can be —loosely— characterized as “exogenous”: for a given level of capital stock
Kaveraget , a crisis breaks out when productive firms’ marginal return on capital, rkt , falls below
the required incentive compatible loan rate, r̄k (condition (27)). In Figure 7.2, this is the case in
equilibrium Aexog, where aggregate productivity At falls from Aaveraget to Alowt . The other polar
type of crisis can be —loosely— characterized as “endogenous”: following an unexpectedly long
period of high productivity Ahight , the household accumulates savings and feeds an investment
boom that increases the stock of capital. All other things equal, the rise in the capital stock
reduces productive firms’ marginal return on capital until rkt < r̄k. The crisis then breaks out
as Kt exceeds Khight , as in equilibrium Aendog. Accordingly, monetary policy can reduce the
incidence of financial crises either by dampening the effects of shocks through a macro–economic
stabilization policy (via the Y– or M–channel), or by improving the resilience of the economy by
slowing down capital accumulation during booms (via notably the K–channel), or by doing both.
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Crisis due to an unusually
large adverse shock (in the








Crisis due to capital overhang fol-
lowing an unusually long sequence
of favorable shocks (in the medium
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Kt+1
Figure 7.3: Predicted Versus Unpredicted Financial Crises
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(h) Marginal Return on Capital
 (Annualized, in %)









(i) Real Interest Rate
 (Annualized, in %)
Top decile Average crisis (see Figure 2) Bottom decile
Note: Simulations for the TR93 economy. Average dynamics of the economy around the beginning of all (black
line), predicted (dashed) and unpredicted (grey) crises (quarter 0), as in Figure 2. The subset of predicted
(unpredicted) crises corresponds to the crises whose one–step–ahead probability in quarter -1 is in the top (bottom)
decile of its distribution (Panel (c)).
As the above discussion suggests, the average dynamics around crises reported in Figure 2
30
mask the heterogeneity of financial crises in our model. To document this heterogeneity, we
contrast in Figure 7.3 the average dynamics around predicted (dashed line) and unpredicted
(grey line) crises with those of the average crisis (black line and Figure 2). For the purpose of this
exercise, we define a crisis as “predicted” (respectively “unpredicted”) if the crisis probability
in the quarter that precedes it (i.e. quarter −1) is in the top (respectively bottom) decile
of its distribution (Panel (c)). Our prior is that endogenous crises are more predictable than
exogenous ones and, therefore, that the crisis probability can be used as a reasonable measure
of endogeneity. The main findings are twofold. First, in line with our prior, unpredicted crises
occur when aggregate productivity is low (Panel (a), grey line), as in the case of crisis Aexog in
Figure 7.2, whereas predicted ones follow an investment boom (Panel (b), dashed line), and occur
despite aggregate productivity being above average (Panel (a), dashed line), as in the case of
crisis Aendog. Second, the distribution of the one–quarter–ahead crisis probability is left–skewed
(Panel (c)), with means that the bulk of crises in our model are predicted/endogenous —albeit
imperfectly. These findings are consistent with recent empirical and the notion that financial
crises are the byproduct of predictable boom–bust financial cycles (see Greenwood, Hanson,
Schleifer, and Ahm Sørensen (2021)).
7.3 The Role of Crisis Expectations: Savings Glut and Markup Externalities
Figure 7.4: Savings Glut and Markup Externalities
Level

















(b) Markup Rate (in %)
Frictional credit market Frictionless credit market
Note: The dashed lines correspond to the unconditional average in each economy.
Difference (Frictional credit market − Frictionless credit market)



















(b) Markup Rate (in %)
Notes: Comparison of two economies under TR93 with a frictional versus frictionless credit market. For the
frictional credit market economy: same average dynamics as in Figure 2. For the frictionless credit market
economy: counterfactual average dynamics, when the economy (i.e. the textbook NK economy) starts with the
same capital stock in quarter t = −20 and is fed with the same technology shocks as the frictional credit market
economy (Figure 2, Panels (a)).
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Figure 7.4 illustrates the effects of crisis expectations during investment booms. It compares the
dynamics of capital and markups during booms in an economy with a frictional credit market
(black line) and an economy with a frictionless credit market (grey line). Our focus is on the
period from quarter -20 to quarter -1. During this period, the credit market functions perfectly
and the entire capital stock is used productively and efficiently in both economies. The only
difference between the two economies over this period is that, in the frictional credit market
one, the household and retailers anticipate that a crisis is coming. These anticipations result in
higher capital stock and markups (bottom panels), reflecting the accumulation of precautionary
savings by the household (savings glut externality) and retailers’ front–loading of price increases
(markup externality) ahead of the crisis.
7.4 Standard Behavior of the Model Around Steady State
Figure 7.5: Short Run Effects: Impulse Response Functions









































(c) Marginal Return on Capital
SIT ϕy = 0.125 (TR93) ϕy = 0.25
Note: Generalized impulse response functions following a negative technology under SIT, and the Taylor–type
rule with ϕπ = 1.5 and ϕy = 0.125 (TR93) or ϕy = 0.25, around the average of the ergodic distribution in the
stochastic steady state.
Figure 7.5 compares the effects of a negative one–standard deviation technology shock on output,
markups, and productive firms’ marginal return on capital, under SIT (black line), TR93 (grey
line), and a Taylor–type rule with ϕy = 0.25 (dashed line), at the stochastic steady state of
the economy. Around this steady state, the economy is in normal times, the probability of a
crisis is small, and the economy behaves like an economy with a frictionless credit market, which
corresponds to the textbook NK economy. The differences across policy rules are well known.
Following the negative shock, output falls by less while markups fall by more under Taylor–type
rules than under SIT. As both effects limit the fall in productive firms’ marginal return on
capital, following a Taylor–type rule makes the economy more resilient than following SIT (see
relation (27)).
7.5 Model With Both Technology and Demand Shocks
The aim of this section is to briefly describe the dynamics of our model in the presence of
both technology and demand (risk–premium) shocks à la Smets and Wouters (2007).33 For
33Such a shock creates a wedge between the interest rate controlled by the central bank and the return on assets
held by the household, and has the exact opposite effects of a demand shock. A positive risk–premium (hence a
negative demand) shock typically increases the required return on assets and reduces current consumption. At
32
the purpose of comparison with our baseline case with technology shocks only, we re–calibrate
parameter µ so that the economy still spends 8% of the time in a crisis in the presence of demand




ρz As in Smets and Wouters (2007) 0.220
σz 0.230
Proportion of unproductive firms
µ The economy spends 8% of the time in a crisis 0.0239
Figure 7.6 reports the average dynamics around crises in this economy. The comparison with
Figure 2 in the main text shows that the presence of demand shocks does not affect the main
dynamics and, in particular, the way macro–financial imbalances build up ahead of crises. The
main difference with our baseline economy with technology shock only is to be found in the
economy’s short run response to shocks. Under TR93, the central bank lets output decline in
the face of negative technology and demand shocks, which explains why crises coincide with
recessions —the Y–channel. At the same time, markups typically increase following negative
demand shocks and decrease following negative technology shocks. These shocks therefore affect
the probability of a crisis in opposite directions through the M–channel (see Figure 7.6).
Figure 7.6: Average Dynamics Around Crises With Both Technology and Demand Shocks
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(j) Real Interest Rate
 (Annualized, in %)
Note: Simulations for the TR93 economy, in the presence of both technology and risk–premium shocks à la Smets
and Wouters (2007). Average dynamics of the economy around the beginning of a crisis (in quarter 0), as in
Figure 2.
the same time, it also increases firms’ cost of capital and reduces the value of capital and investment. In a model
with endogenous capital accumulation but without capital adjustment costs, like ours, this type of demand shock
thus generates a positive correlation between consumption and investment —unlike a discount factor shock.
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Whether a crisis breaks out depends on the relative strengths of the Y– M– and K– channels
as well as the size of the technology versus demand shocks. To get a sense of which type
of shock is most conducive to a crisis, we solve and simulate our model separately for two
“counterfactual” economies that experience either technology or demand shocks —not both— and
compute statistics on crises (see Table 7.2 as well as Figure 7.7). The main result is that crises
are essentially due to technology shocks —either alone or in combination with demand shocks.
Being relatively more persistent (see Table 1), such shocks are indeed more likely to give rise to
protracted booms and capital overhang, which are pre-conditions for a crisis. Technology–driven
crises also last twice as long as the demand–driven ones and, accordingly, are associated with
larger losses in output.
Figure 7.7: Average Dynamics Around Crises With Either Technology or Demand Shocks













































































(i) Marginal Return on Capital
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(j) Real Interest Rate
 (Annualized,in %)
Model with TFP shocks only Model with demand shocks only
Note: Simulations under TR93 for counterfactual economies with either technology (black line) or risk–premium
shocks à la Smets and Wouters (2007) (grey line) shocks. Average dynamics of the economy around the beginning
of a crisis (in quarter 0), as in Figure 2.
Table 7.2: Crisis statistics and origins
Crisis Output
time (%) loss (%)
Economy with both shocks [8.00] -3.20
Economy with TFP shocks only 3.42 -4.76
Economy with demand shocks only 0.00 -2.90
Note: The first row reports statistics of the stochastic steady state ergodic distribution in the economy with both
technology and demand shocks. The second and third rows report the same statistics, in counterfactual economies
that experience either technology or demand shocks. In all cases, we assume that the central bank follows a TR93.
“Crisis time” is the percentage of the time that the economy spends in a crisis (in %). By construction, it is equal
to 8% under TR93 (square brackets). “Output loss” is the percentage fall in output from one quarter before the
crisis until the trough of the crisis (in %).
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Table 7.3: Economic Performance and Welfare Under Alternative Policy Rules With Both Supply
and Demand Shocks
Frictionless Frictional credit market
CEVSIT CEVSIT CEVF B Crisis Length Output E(π2t )
Rule ϕy (%) (%) (%) time (%) (quarter) loss (%)












0.025 -0.0116 -0.0992 -0.1566 13.11 1.75 -4.06 0.0006
0.050 -0.0093 -0.0822 -0.1396 11.74 1.77 -3.77 0.0014
0.125 -0.0062 -0.0407 -0.0980 [8.00] 1.78 -3.20 0.0065
0.250 -0.0064 -0.0012 -0.0583 3.93 1.75 -2.71 0.0200
0.500 -0.0126 0.0270 -0.0298 0.46 1.46 -2.10 0.0524
0.750 -0.0203 0.0231 -0.0337 0.04 1.18 -1.53 0.0834
Note: Same statistics as in Table 2.
7.6 Equations of the Model
The differences between our model and the textbook NK model are highlighted in red.














































9. Yt = Ct + It
10. Λt,t+1 ≡ β
C−σt+1
C−σt
11. 1 + rt =
1 + it−1
1 + πt
12. Kt+1 = It + (1 − δ)Kt
13. ωt =
{
1 if rkt ≥ µ−δ1−µ
1 − µ otherwise
7.7 Global Solution Method
The model is solved by approximating expectations using a collocation technique (see Christiano
and Fisher (2000)). We first discretize the distribution of the shocks using the approach
35
proposed by Rouwenhorst (1995). This leads to a Markov chain representation of the shock,
st, with st ∈ {a1, . . . , ana} × {z1, . . . , znz } and transition matrix T = (ϖij)nanzi,j=1 where ϖij =
P(st+1 = sj |st = si). In what follows, we use na = 5 and nz = 5. We look for an approximate
representation of consumption, gross inflation and the gross nominal interest rate as a function
of the endogenous state variables in each regime, e.g. normal times and crisis times. More





j (n, s)Tj(ν(K)) if K ⩽ K⋆(s)∑px
j=0 ψ
x
j (c, s)Tj(ν(K)) if K > K⋆(s)
for x = {c, π̂, ı̂}
where Tj(·) is the Chebychev polynomial of order j and ν(·) maps [K;K⋆(s)] in the normal
regime (respectively [K⋆(s);K] in the crisis regime into) [-1;1].35 ψxj (r, s) denotes the coefficient
of the Chebychev polynomial of order j is the approximation of variable x when the economy is
in regime r and the shocks are s = (a, z). px denotes the order of Chebychev polynomial we use
for approximating variable x.
K⋆(s) denotes the threshold in physical capital beyond which the economy falls in a crisis,
defined as
rqt + δ =
αYt
(1 − τ)MtKt
= µ(1 − δ)1 − µ (32)
This value is unknown at the beginning of the algorithm as it depends on the decisions of the
agents. We therefore also need to formulate a guess for this threshold.
7.7.1 Algorithm
The algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. Choose a domain [Km,Ks] of approximation for Kt and stopping criteria ε > 0 and εk > 0.
The domain is chosen such that Km and Ks are located 30% away from the deterministic
steady state of the model (located in the normal regime). We chose ε = εk = 1e−4.
2. Choose an order of approximation px (we chose px = 9) for x = {c, π̂, ı̂}), compute the nk





for ℓ = 1, . . . , nk
and formulate an initial guess36 for ψxj (n, s) for x = {c, π̂, ı̂} and i = 1, . . . , na × nz.
Formulate a guess for the threshold K⋆(s).





2 +Km for K ⩽ K⋆(s)
(ζℓ + 1)Ks−K
⋆(s)
2 +K⋆(s) for K > K⋆(s)
for ℓ = 1, . . . , 2nk.
34Throughout this section, we denote π̂ = 1 + π and ı̂ = 1 + i.
35More precisely, ν(K) takes the form ν(K) = 2 K−K




in the crisis regime.
36The initial guess is obtained from a first order approximation of the model around the deterministic steady
state.
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4. Using a candidate solution Ψ = {ψxj (r, si);x = {c, π̂, ı̂}, r = {n, c}, i = 0 . . . px}, com-
pute approximate solutions Gc(K; si), Gπ̂(K; si) and Gı̂(K; si) for each level of Kℓ,
ℓ = 1, . . . , 2nk and each possible realization of the shock vector si, i = 1, . . . , na × nz and
the over quantities of the model using the definition of the general equilibrium of the
economy (see below). In particular, compute the next period capital K ′ℓ,i = GK(Kℓ; zi) for
each ℓ = 1, . . . , 2nk and i = 1 . . . na × nz.
5. Using the next period capital and the candidate approximation, solve the general equilib-
rium to obtain next period quantities and prices entering the expectations in the household’s























u′(Gc(K ′ℓ,i, z′s))GY (K ′ℓ,i, z′s)Gπ̂(K ′ℓ,i, z′s)(Gπ̂(K ′ℓ,i, z′s) − 1)
]
(35)






˜̂ıt = zu′(Gc(Kℓ, zi))
Ẽı̂,t
(37)














7. Project c̃t, ˜̂ıt, ˜̂πt on the Chebychev polynomial Tj(·) to obtain a new candidate vector of
approximation coefficients, Ψ̃. If ∥Ψ̃ − Ψ∥ < εξ then a solution was found and go to step
8, otherwise update the candidate solution as
ξΨ̃ + (1 − ξ)Ψ
where ξ ∈ (0, 1] can be interpreted as a learning rate, and go back to step 3.
8. Upon convergence of Ψ, compute K̃⋆(s) that solves (32). If ∥K̃⋆(s) −K⋆(s)∥ < εkξk then
a solution was found, otherwise update the threshold as
ξkK̃
⋆(s) + (1 − ξk)K⋆(s)
where ξk ∈ (0, 1] can be interpreted as a learning rate on the threshold, and go back to
step 3.
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7.7.2 Computing the General Equilibrium
In this section, we explain how the general equilibrium is solved. Given a candidate solution Ψ ,
we present the solution for a given level of the capital stock K, a particular realization of the
shocks (a, z). For convenience, and to save on notation, we drop the time index.
For a given guess on the threshold, K⋆(a, z), test the position of K.
If K ⩽ K⋆(a, z), the economy is in normal times. Using the approximation guess, we get
immediately
C = Gnc (K, s), π̂ = Gnπ̂(K, s), ı̂ = Gnı̂ (K, s)
and q = 1. If K > K⋆(a, z), the economy is in crisis times. Using the approximation guess, we
get immediately
C = Gcc(K, s), π̂ = Gcπ̂(K, s), ı̂ = Gcı̂ (K, s)














which leads to a markup rate of





and a rate of return on capital of




The investment level obtains directly from the resource constraint as
x = Y − c
implying a value for the next capital stock of
K ′ = x+ (1 − δ)K
7.7.3 Accuracy
In order to asses the accuracy of the approach, we compute the relative errors an agent would






































where Rc(K, z) and Rı̂(K, z) denote the relative error in terms of consumption an agent would
make by using the approximate expectation rather than the “true” rational expectation in the
household’s Euler equation. Rπ̂(K, z) corresponds to the error on inflation. All these errors are
evaluated for values for the capital stock that lie outside of the grid that was used to compute
the solution. We used 1,000 values uniformly distributed between Km and Ks. Table 7.4 reports
the average of absolute errors, Ex = log10( 1nk×na×nz
∑
|Rx(K, s)|), for x ∈ {c, ı̂, π̂}.
Table 7.4: Accuracy Measures
Average absolute errors
ϕy E
c E ı̂ Eπ̂












0.025 -5.5378 -5.5277 -5.2331
0.050 -5.4967 -5.5603 -5.1380
0.125 -5.3805 -5.1154 -4.9550
0.250 -5.2889 -4.9216 -4.8640
0.500 -5.5570 -4.9748 -5.0796
0.750 -5.5235 -4.8875 -5.0160
Note: Ex = log10( 1nk×na×nz
∑
|Rx(K, s)|) is the average of the absolute difference, in terms of the level of
consumption, that is obtained if agents use the approximated expectation of variable x instead of its “true”
rational expectation, for x ∈ {c, ı̂, π̂}.
Concretely, Ec = 10−5.6088 (first row, second column) means that the average error an agent
makes in terms of consumption by using the approximated decision rule —rather than the true
one— under SIT amounts to $2.46 per $1,000,000 spent. The largest approximation errors in the
decision rules are made at the threshold values for the capital stock where the economy shifts
from normal to crisis times. But even there, the maximal errors are relatively small, in the order
of $150 per $1000,000 of consumption, and rare. By the usual standards, our approximation of
agents’ decision rules is therefore very accurate.
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